By Juan Larrosa (January 26, 2026)
A few days ago, Mexico’s National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI) released the most recent results of the National Urban Public Security Survey (ENSU). The data are not encouraging: in December 2025, 63.8% of the adult population reported feeling unsafe in the city where they live. In other words, nearly two out of every three people live with fear. This runs counter to the figures disseminated by the federal government, according to which 2025 closed with an average of 56.6 homicides per day—a significant reduction compared to the 84 daily killings reported in 2024.
As the specialized press has documented, there is bewilderment within the federal government itself regarding this gap: how can a substantial drop in intentional homicides fail to translate into a comparable improvement in the public’s perception of safety?
In a previous column, I argued that one of the reasons behind the U.S. intervention in Venezuela was its propagandistic character. Following U.S. colleagues, we referred to this as “action as propaganda”: the action itself—a military deployment—functioned as a political message, designed to communicate power, capability, and control. It was an effective strategy in symbolic terms: what mattered was not so much what was said, but what was done, and what that action communicated to the world.
This logic is not foreign to the Mexican case. In matters of public security, “action as propaganda” has been present at least since 2006, when Felipe Calderón declared the so-called war on drugs. Since then, successive administrations have sought to communicate spectacular blows—captures of major traffickers, seizures, military operations—to construct a narrative of a state in control and superior to criminal organizations. These highly mediatized acts aim to produce a symbolic effect of authority and effectiveness.
The problem is that this logic has clear limits. The episode of Ovidio Guzmán’s release in 2019 is illustrative: what was meant to be a demonstration of power became an informational boomerang that weakened the image of state control. The action, rather than communicating strength, communicated vulnerability.
Something similar is happening today. The capture of criminal leaders, the transfer of offenders to the United States, the dismantling of laboratories, and the reduction in homicides are undoubtedly relevant actions. They communicate, and they are often wrapped in propagandistic strategies. However, it is naïve to think that these actions alone will transform perceptions of insecurity.
The ENSU clearly shows why. Even if homicides decline, other experiences that structure fear persist: extortion, robberies, frequent gunfire, and drastic changes in everyday life. More than 40% of the population has stopped carrying out basic activities—going out at night, carrying valuables—out of fear of crime.
For this reason, the federal government would do well not to repeat the mistakes of past administrations: relying on media-control strategies or propagandistic “blows” as a substitute for a comprehensive policy. The reduction in homicides is good news, but it is not enough. As long as everyday experience remains marked by fear, “action as propaganda” will continue to reveal its limits.
This text was originally read on Informativo NTR Radio, broadcast on January 26, 2026, and hosted by journalist Sonia Serrano.